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Compulsory manpower mobilization may be described as those forms of govern-
mental control or regulation which are designed to achieve maximum utilization of
the manpower of a nation in the armed forces, the production of materials needed for
the prosecution of a war and the maintenance of essential civilian needs." A labor
mobilization program may begin with the division of the total available manpower
between the armed forces and civilian activities. 2 The program may ultimately
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1 As of this date no direct compulsory measures, statutory or otherwise, have been instituted in the
field of labor mobilization. The occupational deferment provisions of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 885, 50 U. S. C. §30x, hereinafter referred to as "The Selective Service Act of
1940," constitute an indirect pressure exerted sub silentio on the worker himself. See note a inlra.
'Section 5(e)(i) of the Selective Service Act of 194o authorizes the President by regulation to
provide for the deferment of "those men whose employment in industry, agriculture, or other occupa-
tions or employment, or whose activity in other endeavors, is found . . . to be necessary to the main-
tenance of the national health, safety, or interest." Emphasis thus far has been upon the dependency
deferment rather than upon the occupational deferment, dependency (Class III) being determined prior
to occupational status (Classes II-A and II-B). Selective Serv. Reg. (ad ed.) §623.21. Heretofore,
neither the individual's potential usefulness in other than his present employment nor the prospective
need for his occupational skills appears to have been a pertinent consideration in applying the occupational
deferment, except in the limited field where his current status (as unemployed or engaged in non-
essential work) is attributable to a "seasonal or temporary interruption." Selective Serv. Reg. (ad ed.)
§622.24; cf. Selective Serv. System Release No. 185, Feb. 28, 1941. Bus. & DsFENsE CooRDINATOR,
p. 6,oxr. Since all deferments are discretionary with the President and no order of application is
prescribed in the law, the emphasis can readily be shifted to enable operation of the statute in a manner
more conducive to effective labor mobilization. Public No. 625, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1942),
by providing dependents' allowances to men in military service, may facilitate such a shift. The recent
Executive Order establishing the War Manpower Commission which vests broad powers in the Chair-
man to provide for the effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the nation's manpower,
should lead to a more realistic allocation of manpower (on a qualitative basis) between the armed
forces and essential civilian activities. Exec. Order No. 9139, April 18, 1942, 7 FEn. REo. 2919. War
Manpower Commission Directive No. V, to the Director of Selective Service, clearly reflects such an
approach. 7 FED. REG. 4749 (1942). A possible obstacle to centrally planned and executed allocation
is the seeming autonomy of the local boards of the Selective Service System in deferment determinations.
Selective Service Act of X940, §5(e).
It has been suggested that the pressure potentially exertable upon the individual in the form of
threatened induction into military service might become the principal coercive force behind such
measures of worker control as may be desired. BtRucH, TA .ING THE PRosrIrs OUT OF WAR (1931) 34;
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF WARTIME LABOR MOBILIZATION
involve specific directions by the Government to an individual to work at a desig-
nated task in a designated enterprise. Between the two extremes lie a multitude of
measures and methods which may be applied progressively as the exigencies of
current events require.
Since compulsory labor mobilization in our country3 will probably be progressive
in character, this discussion of some of its legal aspects will be based on the pro-
gressive steps which may be taken.4 The alternative approach-to depict full and
complete labor mobilization as it might appear in its final stage with a legal analysis
of each detail-has been rejected because some of the steps discussed might not
appear or might take different form, and because the ensuing conclusions which
would then necessarily be based on the relation of each phase to the completed whole,
might be misleading.
Effective utilization of the manpower of a nation necessarily entails, with respect
to the individual worker, his placement and retention in that employment in which
his capacities can be most effectively utilized in the national interest. Insofar as these
objectives are accomplished by compulsion contrary to the individual's will, exerted
either directly by the Government or indirectly by economic pressures govern-
mentally inspired, certain peacetirhe rights of the individual are necessarily affected.
These include the right to remain idle,5 the right to seek employment in whatever
way desired, the right to choose one's employer and employment, and the right to
bargain freely as to the terms of one's employment. These and other rights com-
Note, Mobilization for Defense (1940) 54 HARv. L. REv. 278, 292. The limited effectiveness of a
"Work or Fight" policy under the Selective Service Act of 1940 is apparent. Among its deficiencies
are the non-liability for military service of women and of men in certain age groups, §3(a), the pro-
hibition against deferment by occupational or industrial groups, §5(e), the possible induction or volun-
tary enlistment in the armed forces of individuals with critical shortage skills required for essential
war production, and the implication that service in the armed forces is a penalty for failure to serve
more effectively elsewhere. The pertinence of First World War experience and thinking may also be
doubted since thus far, at least, current labor shortages have been qualitative rather than quantitative.
A "Work or Fight" policy is most effective in securing unskilled or semiskilled labor. Our present
major problem involves the most effective utilization of workers possessing critical shortage skills, many
of whom are already in war work. Of two individuals with identical employment, dependency and
physical status, but differing in that only one possesses a critical shortage skill required for essential
war production, it is doubtful whether §5(e) of the Act may be construed and applied to defer the less
skilled individual and to induct the specially skilled individual who refuses to work where he is most
urgently needed.
'For a summary of compulsory labor mobilization in other countries, see Hoague, Brown, and
Marcus, Wartime Conscription and Control of Labor (1940) 54 HtAv. L. Rav. 50. For recent im-
portant developments in Canadian labor mobilization, see Nat. Selective Serv. Order of March 21, 1942
(P. C. 2250); Stabilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations, March 2a, 1942 (P' C. 2251);
Essential Work (Scientific and Technical Personnel) Regulations, 1942, March 4, 1942 (P. C. 638); and
Order for Compulsory Registration of Unemployed Male Persons, May 59, 1942. Canada, Emergency
Laws, Orders and Reg., pt. 37, PP. 27-41.
' "We have frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not
embrace all the evils within its reach. The Constitution does not forbid 'cautious advance, step by
step,' in dealing with the evils which are exhibited in activities within the range of legislative power."
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (1937).
As to the right not to work, see 3 WILLOUGHBY, CONSrnrTrsO OF THE UNITED STATES (1929)
§i2oo; Keefer, Has a Person a Constitutional Right to Abstain from Work? (i92i) 29 W. Va. L. Q. 20.
Cf. ex pate Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S. E. 327 (1920); State v. McClure, 5o5 At. 712 (Del.
599).
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monly enjoyed by individuals and frequently considered inviolate by the courts
must be restricted in whole or in part if the primary objectives are to be secured.7
From the standpoint of the employer, the objectives of labor mobilization are
corollaries of the above. The employer must facilitate the employment of the worker
in that employment in which his capacities can be best utilized in the national interest
and the expenditure in that employment of the worker's utmost effort. The employer
likewise must surrender certain rights, for example, the right freely to solicit workers,
the right to employ or not to employ, the right to fix the terms and conditions of
employment, etc. Likewise, other persons or groups concerned in the relationship
such as labor and employer organizations, employment agencies,8 and even state and
local governments9 may be compelled to surrender rights to the extent that their
exercise would interfere with the desired objectives.
The restriction of these rights might be accomplished in several ways. Three
possible approaches suggest themselves. Labor mobilization might be accomplished
in much the same manner and on the basis of the same principles as military con-
scription; all workers would be "conscripted" 10 into a force resembling in objective
and methods the organization now governing the armed forces of the nation. Inas-
much as the source of military law lies chiefly in historical precedent and in the
express constitutional authority in the Congress, not only to raise armies but also to
prescribe rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces,11 this method
of achieving compulsory labor mobilization would undoubtedly meet constitutional
difficulties. Although certain forms of military service approximate certain forms of
service carried on by labor in civilian life, the power to govern and regulate the land
and naval forces, in the course of which certain services may be required not of them-
selves military in character, differs materially from the power to declare war, to
support armies and to maintain navies.12 Neither power may include the power to
conscript and to govern, as an army is governed, the working forces of a nation."
' Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. x (1915); Adair v. U. S.,
208 U. S. x61 (r9o8); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897); 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LISrmA-
noNs (8th ed. 1927) 1341.
" Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have stressed the principle that all these so-called rights or
liberties are not immune to infringement by Congress or the States in the exercise of constitutional
powers. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941); NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp-, 301
U. S. r (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S.
161 (i9o8) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915) have been "completely sapped * 0 * of their
authority." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. i77, x87 (i94).
' Cf. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941).
'CI. Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 3i3 U. S. 508 (1941); U. S. v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936);
Wayne County v. U. S., 53 Ct. Cls. 417 (1918), aff'd, 252 U. S. 574 (1920). "Whenever the con-
situtional powers of the federal government and those of the state come into conflict, the latter must
yield." Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 17 (1927).
" The word "conscription" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.), as "a
compulsory enrollment of men for military and naval service." Conscription of labor thus appropri-
ately describes this approach but the term is misleading when used with relation to other forms of
labor mobilization not involving control equivalent or analogous to that exercised over the armed
forces.
'
2 U. S. Cous'r., Art. 1, §8, cls. j2 and 14.
"r1d. Art. x, §8, cls. ii, 12 and 13; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (s9s8).
"
8 The conclusion might be different in instances of military government in which the military has
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A second possible approach to a compulsory labor mobilization program is direct
operation by the Government of all essential war production enterprises 14 The
power of the Government, during war time, to enter fields ordinarily occupied by
private enterprise is beyond doubt. Instances during the past and present World War
include the Government's operation of railroads,15 telegraph and telephone facili-
ties,1" and airplane factories. 17 If the Government replaces the private employer,
many of the difficulties presented by the third approach discussed below would be
removed. All doubts based on the distinction between services rendered directly for
the Government and services rendered for private employers would be laid at rest."8
Assuming such replacement of private enterprise, the Government's power to accom-
plish all things necessary in the field of employment relations could not be seriously
doubted.' 9
The third approach is that of increasing governmental control over all facets of
the employment relationship by means of direct or indirect compulsions upon the
various persons involved. It is of importance to recognize that the primary objective
of labor mobilization, ie., the placement of each individual worker in that position
in which his capacities can be most efficiently utilized, can be achieved to a large
degree by measures short of governmental compulsions operating directly upon the
individual worker. If the individual is a wage-earner dependent upon employment
for his livelihood-and this category would include the vast majority of potential
workers in this country-his employment activities can be controlled to a large extent
by controls upon the other party to the employment relationship, ie., the employer.
To the extent that the employment activities of employers are controlled directly or
indirectly, corresponding activities on the part of employees are likewise controlled.
The direction that is thereby given to the activities of the worker will depend not
only upon the degree and nature of the control exercised but also upon the extent to
which the controls apply to all employers. Obviously, if governmental control extends
to only a portion of all employers in the nation, the worker will to that extent be
superseded a suspended sovereignty. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866); 3 WILLOUGHBY,
op. cit. supra note 5, §1041 ct seq. Of considerable interest in this connection arc the measures of com-
pulsory labor mobilization instituted by the Military Governor under the state of martial law now
existing in Hawaii. These include the freezing of wages, regulation of hours on essential projects, and
prohibitions against leaving essential employment. Wash. Post, April 5, 1942. For a discussion of the
validity of other measures instituted in Hawaii, see Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii (1942) 30 C.LIF.
L. REv. 371.
1" "Conscription of industry" has been widely discussed in connection with the "universal draft"
principle. For a discussion of its constitutionality if unaccompanied by just compensation, see Cormack,
The Universal Draft and Constitutional Limitations (1930) 3 So. CALIF. L. REv. 361.
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135 (1919).
"
5 Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163 (i919).
" Occasions during the last and present war where entire enterprises were commandeered or simply
"taken over" by the Federal Government are collected and discussed in Note, American Economic Mobili-
zation (1942) 55 Hzav. L. REv. 427, 518. In none of these were any measures of compulsory labor
mobilization taken.
" See note 65, infra.
a'U. S. CoNsTr., Art. 1, §8, cl. 18; cf. Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146 (1919);
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
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free to pursue his unrestricted employment activities with employers not within the
purview of the Government's regulation. Employer control as contrasted with
worker control offers for many reasons a more expedient approach to labor mobiliza-
tion, at least in the early stages. Some of these reasons are discussed below.
The rights of employers in the employment relationship have undoubtedly come
to be regarded as less sacred and inviolable than the corresponding rights of em-
ployees. In a certain sense, controls upon the exercise of these rights involve restric-
tions upon the employer's "liberty of contract," as contrasted with the more sacred
personal rights of the worker. The employer enjoys the fruits of an individual's
labor; the employer's activities are generally associated with the contractual side
of the relationship rather than with the actual expenditure of personal service.2"
Control of employers' employment activities has been frequently and widely exercised
by both state and federal governments. Many precedents exist which justify such
control from a constitutional standpoint. These precedents have arisen not only as
a result of the exercise by the states of their police power2' but also are numerous in
connection with the exercise by Congress of its interstate commerce, war, and other
powers. 22
Wartime controls of the owners and producers of scarce materials and facilities
are very closely analogous to controls over an employer's hiring and utilization of
workers possessing shortage skills required for essential war production. Recent acts
of Congress not only operate positively to require employers to fill Government orders
or to give preference to orders of certain private persons, but also operate negatively
to prohibit the sale or disposition of certain materials and facilities.23 Controls upon
employers, necessary to secure the allocation and distribution of the labor supply
essential for the maintenance of necessary civilian and war production activities, may
entail much less drastic measures than those now in effect in connection with the
allocation and distribution of essential materials and facilities. Another factor entitled
to some weight is the fact that the employer's bargaining power is usually more
2 Opposition raised by employers to laws regulating phases of the employment relationship has
been based on liberty or freedom of contract rights. No case has been found in which the employer
has interposed any defense analogous to that which the worker might raise under the Thirteenth
Amendment or on the ground of deprivation of personal liberty under the Fourteenth or Fifth Amend-
ments. Cf. Marcus Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. X70 (1921).
'Manner of paying wages: McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909); Knoxville Iron Co. v.
Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 (igoi). Hours of work: Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (97); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (19o8); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (x898). Contract liniting tort
liability: Chicago, B. & 0. R. R. v. McGuire, 2r9 U. S. 549 (191). Employment of women: Radice
v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 (r924). CI. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (x888).
"U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 30 U. S. x (1937);
Patterson v. Bark Endora, x9o U. S. 169 (1903). Cf. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. i
(1912).
" The statutes and their administration are discussed in Note, American Economic Mobilization
(1942) 50 HAsv. L. Rav. 427. See, for example, §2(a) of the Priorities Act, 54 STAT. 676 (1940) as
amended, 4x U. S. C. (Supp. I) and §9 of the Selective Service Act of 1940. Under these acts authority
has been asserted and exercised to limit, restrict and prohibit certain types of production deemed unneces.
sary and to regulate the use of certain scarce materials. Note, American Economic Mobilization, supra,
at 455-465.
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potent than that of the worker,24 with the result that considerable restriction of the
employer's usual rights in the employment relationship may be accomplished without
raising the worker to a preferred position. Finally, it is noteworthy that if employer
controls result in substantial economic losses, such losses can be more effectively
compensated by the Government. The employer can usually be made whole by
money compensation if the payment of such compensation is necessary or expedient
for constitutional or other reasons; deprivation resulting from regulation of the
worker's rights in the employment relationship are not so readily compensated.25
From an administrative point of view, it is undoubtedly an easier task to regulate,
directly or indirectly, employers than it is to enforce compulsory measures upon
employees. Because employers are far less numerous than employees, greater cover-
age is achieved by application of the control to a few and the end to be accomplished
entails substantially simpler policing. Again, the employer is usually more susceptible
to indirect controls than is the employee; considerable influence upon an employer's
hiring and employment practices might be exercised through his government con-
tracts as well as through governmenlt controls of the raw materials, supplies and
facilities without which the employer cannot continue his business?,
Although direct compulsion may be brought upon the employer without simul-
taneously bringing direct compulsion to bear upon the employee, in a practical sense
the reverse is not true. If the role of the employer in the employment relationship is
to control and supervise his employees, the manner in which that control and super-
vision is exercised is of paramount importance in the full utilization of an available
labor supply. In fact, control of the employer is the only available means of securing
desired results in certain parts of this field. The problems of labor conservation and
of labor utilization cannot be met without controls upon the employer's activities in
the employment process and relationship? 7
If compulsory labor mobilization in our country proceeds by progressive steps, the
first steps will probably involve the regulation and control of employers to the
exclusion of direct controls upon workers. If and when employer controls fail to
meet adequately the increasing labor demands of an expanding war economy, worker
control will be the next resort. To the extent that the protection of workers and the
achievement of the ends of worker control require, direct regulation of workers will
entail new and additional restrictions upon the rights of employers.
The ensuing discussion can therefore be conveniently divided into (I) measures of
employer control, and (2) measures of worker and employer control.
"4 C. Holden v. Hardy, x69 U. S. 366, 397 (1898); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379, 393 (1937).
" See note 74, infra.
" See Note, American Economic Mobilization (1940) 50 Htav. L. REv. 427. Threat to requisition
or commandeer, assuming the ultimate authority to requisition or commandeer, is not duress. Cf.
American Smelting Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S. 75 (1922); U. S. v. Tengey, 5 Pet. 115 (U. S. 1831).
" See pp. 447 el Sq., infra.
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i. Measures of Employer Control
Three measures of employer control which undoubtedly will be given careful
consideration when and if legislation in the field of compulsory labor mobilization is
deemed necessary, are the following:
(a) Establishment of Labor Priorities and Control of the Hiring Process,
(b) Conservation of Critical Workers and Maximum Utilization of Labor
Force,
(c) Displacement of Workers in Non-essential Activities.
(a) Establishment of Labor Priorities. Just as on the production side of the war
effort, the initial stage in industrial mobilization was the establishment of a system
of priorities or preferences whereby scarce raw materials or needed products and
facilities were reserved for, and allocated to, essential war industries, so in labor
mobilization the initial step will involve an allocation of the available "critical
workers" (workers qualified to perform occupations required for essential war pro-
duction, in which a serious labor shortage exists) to those employers whose need for
such workers is most urgent from the standpoint of the national war supply pro-
gram.2 While production priorities have long been obligatory by statute, labor
priorities as of this date exist only as a policy of the United States Employment
Service29 in referring workers for employment.
" Under the priorities and allocation powers in 52(a) of the Priorities Act, supra note 23, as
recently broadened and clarified by the Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(March 27, 1942), federal authorities have for some time regulated the use and procurement of scarce
materials and products. See e.g., General Preference Order No. P-7, 6 FED. REo., 2875 (1941) (ship-
builders); General Limit. Order L-2, id. 4735 (automobiles); Limitation Order L-7, id. 5534 (use of
steel refrigerators); Supplementary Order M-r-c, id. 2854 (aluminum scrap); General Preference Order
M-i2, id. 4212 (cotton linters); General Metals Order No. x, id. 2239; and General Preference Order
M-i-A, id. 2599 (aluminum). See Weiner, Legal and Economic Problems of Civilian Supply (1942)
9 LAw & Com-rasr. PROB. 122. The recently announced shift in priority procedures to one of fol-
lowing raw materials from their inception to the finished product, may result in the abandonment of
some or all of the above illustrated types of control, but their usefulness as analogies for present pur-
poses would not thereby be impaired.
59The Wagner-Peyser Act, 48 STAT. 113 (933), 29 U. S. C. §49, provided for a national system
of public employment offices to be operated by the states under a system of grants-in-aid made (roughly)
on a 50-50 basis. The various ;tate unemployment insurance laws, enacted subsequently, required that
benefits be paid solely through public employment offices. See, e.g., S. C. Unemployment Compen-
sation Law, §3(a), S. C. Laws 1936, Act No. 946, and cf. Irr. REv. CODE, §16o3(a)(x), 49 STAT.
640 (1935), 26 U. S. C. §W603. This necessitated a great expansion in the public employment office
system in each state, financed almost entirely by federal grants made to state unemployment insurance
agencies under title III of the Social Security Act, 49 STAT. 626 (1935), 42 U. S. C. §502. On January
1, 1942, operation of a national system of public employment offices was undertaken by the Social
Security Board pursuant to the President's direction and determination that the national war effort
required a single, nationally-directed system of public employment offices. Funds for their administra-
tion were made available in the Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2942, Pub. L. No. 246, 77th Cong., ist Sess (July 2, 194). State governments cooperated
in establishing the national system by releasing personnel and facilities, used in their respective state
offices, to the Social Security Board. The federally-operated system is now known as the "United
States Employment Service" and is in the Social Security Board. The Board is under the "supervision
and direction" of the Federal Security Administrator, Reorganization Plan No. 1, §201, effective July
1, 2939, 4 FED. REG. 2728, 53 STAT. 1424, 5 U. S. C., §133. Paul V. McNutt, the Federal Security
Administrator, is also Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. Exce. Order No. 9139, 7 FEn. REo.
2919 (942).
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The United States Employment Service has been filling employers' orders for
workers in accordance with a schedule of priorities roughly based on preferences
established for the war production program 30 Of several employers seeking critical
shortage workers through the United States Employment Service, preference is given
to the order of that employer whose production is most essential to the war effort.
To the extent that employers are dependent for their labor supply upon the United
States Employment Service, the policies observed by the United States Employment
Service in filling employer orders determine the allocations made of available
workers. On the other hand, as long as employers retain and exercise the privilege
of recruiting workers directly or through employment agencies other than the United
States Employment Service, the priorities established by the United States Employ-
ment Service are not only ineffective to accomplish the desired result, but employers
having low, or no, preference ratings are in practical effect induced not to use the
public employment office and to compete with such offices in the open labor market.
Uncontrolled competition for critical workers between non-war and war employers
impedes the desired shift of such workers from non-war to war production, while
uncontrolled competition among war production employers contributes greatly to
needless and wasteful labor turnover and labor unrest.
Governmental control of hirings, possibly restricted to occupations required for
essential war production in which a shortage of qualified workers exists, is therefore
a reasonable initial step in a labor mobilization program. Its twofold purpose being
to insure an adequate supply of workers for essential war industry by enforcement of
priorities and to prevent labor unrest and consequent labor waste by reducing the
inducements to labor turnover, precedents supporting Government-controlled alloca-
tion of necessary raw materials, supplies and facilities and for prevention of waste of
scarce materials and facilities are clearly in point.31 That the public has a legitimate
interest in hiring activities apart from the exercise of war powers is attested by
numerous laws regulating private employment agencies,32 and by laws, both state
and federal, for the creation and maintenance of public employment offices. Such
government control may take the form of (i) requiring all hirings for critical occupa-
o See War Manpower Commission Directive No. III, to U. S. Employment Service, 7 F.. Rao. 4748
(1942).
"For the scope of the war power see the famous dicta of Brandeis, J., in U. S. v. McIntosh, 283
U. S. 605, 622 (1931), and Hughes, C. J., in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.
398, 426 (1934). The constitutionality of an allocation system was apparently assumed in Atwater &
Co. v. U. S., 275 U. S. 188 (1927) and Omnia Commercial Co. v. U. S., 261 U. S. 502 (r923), and
was upheld specifically in Roxford Knitting Mills v. Moore & Tierney, Inc., 265 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 2d,
i919) cert. denied, 253 U. S. 498 (1920). Conservation, and its apposite, prevention of waste, are
clearly proper subjects for governmental concern and control, either as measures of facilitating allocation
or as measures of allocation itself. See Note, American Economic Mobilization (942) 55 HAy. L. Rev.
427, 463 (1942). Measures for prevention of waste of national or state resources have been upheld inde-
pendently of the war powers. Cf. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm. of Oklahoma, 286 U. S.
210 (1932). See note 45 infra. No valid distinction can exist insofar as the employer is concerned
between the allocation of scarce materials and facilities needed in the war effort and the allocation of
scarce labor, the purposes of both measures and their relation to the war effort being identical.
"
2 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (94); Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340 (1916); Brandeis,
J., dissenting in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597 (E957).
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tions to be carried on through public employment offices or subject to their control,
and (2) regulating or prohibiting all forms of public or private solicitation of critical
workers. The prohibition or regulation of solicitation is necessary both to prevent
labor waste, and as an incidental measure reasonably appropriate to the enforcement
of exclusive hiring controls 33
Experience during the current war seems to indicate that national labor shortages
develop largely in a few occupations requiring a high degree of skill and a cor-
respondingly long period of experience and training. Government regulation will
normally, then, be directed at these occupations. Enabling legislation is not likely
to attempt detailed specifications as to the occupations affected. New shortages of
skilled workers in critical occupations will develop, and former shortages may disap-
pear from time to time in the normal metamorphosis of the war production program;
unforeseeable shifts in emphasis are inevitable in the war supply program, while the
demands of the armed forces are unpredictable both as to number and type of men
needed. The immobility of labor will give rise to shortages in some areas while in
other areas the supply of qualified workers may be adequate or even in excess of local
needs. Hence, the likelihood of a general definition of critical occupations and a
delegation of authority to an administrative agency to specify the occupations to
which, and the localities in which, the controls will be applied.3 4
The control may be directed either at the qualifications of the individual hired,
or at the work for which the individual is hired. The first approach appears more
direct and if feasible, more effective; it would involve, however, knowledge on the
part of the employer of the qualifications of each worker he proposes to hire, facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of the worker. Since it would be unreasonable to
charge an employer with the truth and accuracy of facts supplied to him by a
worker,35 the first approach would require some predetermination by the Govern-
ment of each worker's qualifications, and communication of such information to
prospective employers. Each worker might be furnished with a card upon which his
qualifications (or lack of qualifications) are noted, and each employer thereby
charged with knowledge of the qualifications shown on the card, to be produced by
the worker as a condition precedent to a hiring 38
" It is of interest to note that the "regulation" promulgated by the Director of the United States
Employment Service during the First World War undertook not only to require that certain enterprises
hire only through public employment offices but also to restrict solicitation and advertising for labor.
Hoague, Brown & Marcus, supra note 3, at 57. Control of advertising marked the first hesitant step
in both English and Canadian labor mobilization programs. Cf. Control of Employment (Advertise-
ments) Order, 1940, S. R. & 0. 194o, No. 522, BuuEa, WArL LEGISLArIOsI [Eng.] (1940) 6o5; Labor
Enticement Regulations, Nov. 7, 1940 (P. C. 6280), Canada, Emergency Laws, Orders, and Reg., pt. 37,
p. 15. Canada has recendy instituted control of hiring. Control of Employment Regulations, 1942, June
12, 1942 (P. C. 5038), id. Pt. 37, P. 27.
"' Reasonable delegations of this type are beyond question. Cf. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Admin-
istrator, 312 U. S. 126 (1941); Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (94o).
" War does not waive the necessity for due process, one of the requirements of which is the fixing
of an ascertainable standard of guilt. U. S. v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (9pzx).
6Obviously such a system would require a card for every potential worker, whether or not qualified
in the critical occupations. Otherwise failure to produce a card could be attributed either to conceal-
ment by the qualified worker or to an actual lack of qualification. To police the regulation, probably
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Assuming controls applicable solely or primarily to employers, the second ap-
proach is more feasible. The type of work for which a worker is hired is a fact,
knowledge of which is reasonably chargeable to the hiring employer. The only legal
objections that an employer might raise to a law imposing penal sanctions for his
failure to hire persons for specified critical occupations in accordance with prescribed
methods, would be that the restricted occupations were not susceptible of defini-
tion with sufficient precision to charge him with notice that the particular job for
which he hired a worker fell within the prohibited class. The occupations likely to
be so restricted are generally susceptible of descriptions sufficiently precise to meet
any such objection;8 7 such an objection loses all force if the employer is afforded
adequate opportunity to obtain clarification from an administrative agency such as
the public employment offices, or may protect himself by hiring exclusively in accord-
ance with the methods prescribed for the restricted occupations, or both.
(b) Conservation of Critical Workers and Maximum Utilization of Skills. Estab-
lishment and enforcement of labor priorities, with control of hiring as the modus
operandi, leaves the currently employed largely untouched. But just as in the produc-
tion field the exigencies of modern war have necessitated governmental control of
inventories and surplus stocks of scarce materials, 8  so in the labor field it is im-
probable that employers would long be left entirely to their own devices in their
utilization, or waste, of the skills of their current labor force. Government has already
interested itself in the manner in which employers utilize workers in their employ.
Much has been accomplished on a voluntary basis; particularly in cases in which
Government and employer interests coincide, voluntary cooperation may be expected
to continue to play a leading role3 9 But as new shortages develop and old shortages
become more critical, hoarding or wasteful utilization of workers possessing critical
skills by uncooperative employers will become intolerable and direct controls in this
field may be expected.
The term labor conservation, when used with reference to critical workers, em-
braces, positively, the employment of a critical worker exclusively at operations fully
utilizing his special skill, and negatively the release of a critical worker from employ-
ment in which his skill is not, or cannot be, fully utilized. A critical worker may be
employed to perform tasks, none of which involve an exercise of his special skill;
the card would have to be retained by the employer while the worker was in his employ. So long as
there is no general labor shortage and critical occupations remain relatively few, the labeling of every
worker and the consequent inconvenience to those with whose employment the Government is not con-
cerned, would hardly be justified. Innocent loss of a card or its unjustified retention by an employer
may cause hardship to a worker thereby precluded from employment until the lost card is replaced or
returned to him. Analogous "leaving certificates" caused such a furor in England during the last war
as to lead to their abandonment in October, 1917. Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, Wartime Conscription
and Control of Labor (1940) 54 HAuv L. Rv. 5o, 68.
" An ambitious effort to catalogue and define occupations resulted in the "Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles" (1939), prepared by the U. S. Employment Service when a bureau in the Department of
Labor. It is available to public purchasers through the Government Printing Office.
"See Note, .4merican Economic Mobilization (1942) 55 HA .v. L. REV. 427, 455 et Seq.
80 See BusINEsS & DEFENSE COORDINAToR, Fighting Labor Scarcity, C-3, 701 et seq.
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labor conservation in such a case would either require that the worker be released
or employed at an operation or operations in which his skill will be fully utilized. A
critical worker may be employed partly at operations involving an exercise of his
special skill and partly at other severable operations; labor conservation in such a
case would require that the operations be segregated (a process known as "job simpli-
fication") and the critical worker employed exclusively at operations which require
the exercise of his special skill. If an employer is unable or unwilling to offer a
critical worker full-time employment at operations involving exclusively the exercise
of his special skills, labor conservation may require that the worker be released and
made available to other employers who can and will afford such full-time employ-
ment.
Obviously, labor waste is not peculiar to employers engaged in war production;
it may occur wherever critical workers are employed. Controls in this field may
therefore apply to all employers alike, the line being drawn not on the basis of the
occupations or operations in which an employer utilizes a worker, but on the basis of
the qualifications of the workers he employs. Labor waste may be committed by an
employer quite unknowingly, while measures of labor conservation, involving a high
degree of technical knowledge both of machines and men, may be beyond the em-
ployer's ability to conceive and initiate. Government controls in this field may there-
fore be applied through directives or orders issued to the particular employer, setting
forth in reasonable detail the respects in which the employer is wasting critical labor.
If the employer can offer no work at which the skill of the critical worker could be
fully utilized, his release may be ordered. If, on the other hand, the employer's activi-
ties include operations at which a critical worker could be fully utilized, the employer
would presumably be given the choice of fully utilizing the worker's skill, or of
releasing the worker.
Closely akin to conservation of critical workers and in many instances inseparable
in actual practice from it, is the problem of maximum utilization of an employer's
available labor force. Maximum utilization includes not only the full utilization of
critical workers, but also the utilization of semi-skilled or unskilled workers in the
performance of work for which critical workers would be preferred if available.
The interest of Government in the maximum utilization of critical and non-
critical workers differs substantially from its interests in the conservation of critical
labor. Its interests in the latter arise primarily out of the shortage of critical workers
and the necessity that as many as possible be made available for war production; the
employer's choice is either to utilize fully or to release the worker. The Govern-
ment's interest in the maximum utilization of all workers arises out of, and is coex-
tensive with its interest in, the continued production, notwithstanding labor shortages,
of business enterprises. The Government is vitally and legitimately interested in
maximum production by private enterprises producing materials or providing
facilities required in the prosecution of the war. Its interest in the continuation of
private enterprises not engaged in war production is not so apparent. In either case,
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shortages of critical workers may result in the dependence of an enterprise upon the
effectiveness with which management practices conservation in its use of critical labor
and utilizes the services of non-critical workers to perform tasks for which only
non-critical workers are available.
The Government's interest in the continued welfare of private enterprises,
whether or not engaged in war production, is sufficient to warrant an exercise of its
spending power to lend reasonable technical aid where requested and needed.
Maximum production by private enterprises engaged in war production is of suffi-
cient public concern to warrant such control of management as may be required to
insure against avoidable stoppage or impairment of production levels. Whether the
interest of the Government in the continuance of non-essential private enterprises
warrants compulsory measures against the will of the enterprise itself is doubtful.
The problem becomes largely academic in view of the fact that in this field public
and private interests largely coincide, and the fact that the limited number of persons
technically qualified for such work will require that their full attention be devoted
to enterprises engaged in essential war production. The difficulty of differentiating
in a s*tatute between employers engaged in essential war production and those not
so engaged, may justify a failure to make the distinction in the enabling act.40
The principal available measures to effectuate labor conservation and prevent
labor waste are job simplification, discharge and upgrading. Corresponding measures
to promote maximum utilization of an existing labor force are job simplification,
upgrading and training. Discharge of unutilized workers requires no explanation.
Its direct relation to labor conservation is apparent since retention by an employer of
a critical worker whose skills the employer cannot or will not utilize constitutes the
extreme example of labor waste. The impact of this measure upon the employer,
though drastic, is simple and direct. The employer has no absolute right to the
worker's services and the worker has no absolute right to continue in the employer's
employ; though the broken employment contract may have been most valuable to
both and the resulting losses severe, since the Government has asserted no right under
the contract of employment, no infringement of rights guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment is involved.41
"See note 59 infra. If the enforcement is by directives or orders, an employer engaged in war
production against whom the Government seeks to enforce the statute would not be heard to complain
on the grounds that the statute as applied to others might be unconstitutional. I WILLOUGHBY, CON-
srTUTION OF THE UNITED STAT-Es, g; I COOLEY, Consitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 399.
4' Cj. Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. U. S., 261 U. S. 502 (1923), in which the Court said that
"the essence of every executory contract is the obligation which the law imposes upon the parties to
perform it," and that a governmental requisition of the entire product of a steel plant did not purport
to be, or effect, a taking of a contract under which the steel company had contracted to deliver steel
to a third person, nor a taking of the third party's right to demand performance, but merely operated
to end the contract. Id. 51o. Cited with approval was Marshall v. Glanvill, [1917] 2 K. B. 87, to the
effect that a contract of employment is made on the assumption that performance will continue to be
lawful and that the contract comes to an end when the rendition and acceptance of the services becomes
unlawful. Id. 511. Upon similar reasoning the worker would be without remedy. Highland v. Rur-
sell Car & Snow Plow CO., 279 U. S. 253 (1929). Cf. Duckett & Co. v. U. S., 266 U. S. 149 (5924),
and Int. Paper Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 399 (1931), involving, respectively, leasehold and water rights
which were themselves the subject of a requisition.
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Job simplification involves the breaking down or segregation of a complex opera-
tion previously performed by one worker of high skill into several operations, one
or more of which is capable of being performed by workers of lesser skill. Its perti-
nence both to labor conservation and to maximum utilization is apparent; in the
process a critical worker is released from operations not requiring the full exercise of
his skill, while at the same time all or part of a complex operation is performed by
non-critical workers, an adequate supply of whom presumedly exists. Job simplifica-
tion is a technical and complex process requiring expert knoyledge, a process well
within the traditional province of management. Such being its nature, controversy is
inevitable not only as to the need for job simplification in a particular case, but also
as to the method of its accomplishment.
Upgrading involves the employment of a worker in that operation in which his
skill can be most effectively utilized, the choice of operations being based largely
upon the available supply of labor. This measure is inextricably bound up with job
simplification and training, the former decreasing the degree of skill required and
the latter making possible the acquisition of such skill as is required. In its legal
aspects, upgrading differs little from job simplification.
Training in a limited form is properly a measure of maximum utilization; it
constitutes a labor conservation measure only if failure to develop potential skills con-
stitutes a form of labor waste. As used in this discussion, the term "training" includes
all training and instruction afforded by an employer as an incident to the full utiliza-
tion of his workers for his own needs. If incidental to upgrading, training must be
justified as a proper subject of Government regulation and control upon the same
theory as upgrading is justified, and presumedly would have the same legal implica-
tions. Training provided by an employer in order to meet the needs of other
employers, or to increase the general labor supply, is not within the purview of a
maximum utilization program. If the purpose and nature of a training program
bears no relation to the increased efficiency or production of the employer required
to provide particular training, such training would probably be required under prin-
ciples analogous to those of eminent domain,42 and appropriate compensation
provided.
Assuming that the need for governmental intervention can be demonstrated and
that the method of its exercise is reasonable, little doubt exists that the war powers of
Congress authorize the measures of control over private enterprise contemplated in
labor conservation and maximum utilization programs. 43 Labor conservation in the
42 That the power of eminent domain extends to a taking which in its immediate result benefits
another person, has often been recognized. A use is no less a public use because private persons are
the immediate beneficiaries. This, of course, is as true in the case of eminent domain as in the case of
the police power. Strickley v. Highland Bay Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (igo6); Clark v. Nash, 198
U. S. 361 (1905). Cf. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (x928). Compulsory training of workers
either for the labor needs of a particular employer (other than the training employer) or for the general
betterment of the labor market would probably constitute a taking for a public use and as such require
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26o U. S. 393
(192).
" "But there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the State
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sense here used has precedents in measures taken during the preceding and the cur-
rent war for the conservation of scarce materials, facilities and commodities essential
to the war effort; wartime conservation in other fields has been obscured by indirec-
tion of method, but similarity in purpose exists notwithstanding the dissimilarity of
approach.44 Waste itself has long been a matter of public concern and a proper
subject of Government control. Waste in itself, however innocent, may constitute an
evil which is subject to Government prohibition.45
In considering the validity of compulsory measures designed to insure maximum
utilization of a labor force, the most difficult case is presented if no reliance is placed
upon the respects in which maximum utilization aids in the prevention of labor
waste or upon the principles citable in support of waste prevention. Assuming that
waste of potential skills is a proper subject of governmental restraint, the appropriate
remedy for waste, i-.e, release of the potentially skilled worker, would not promote
the objectives of maximum utilization. The primary object of the Government in a
maximum utilization program is not to prevent labor waste as an end in itself but to
insure the continued and maximum productivity of a particular plant or enterprise,
notwithstanding a labor shortage.
It is assumed that compulsory measures to effect maximum utilization of a labor
force will in practice be the Government's last resort, taken only after all measures to
secure voluntary cooperation have been exhausted and only when the emergency is
great. The validity of such compulsory measures may therefore be considered as
applied to a recalcitrant employer whose continued and maximum production is
vitally necessary to the supply of the armed forces or the maintenance of essential
civilian needs. Unless such employer fully utilizes his present labor force, prevailing
scarcities of critical workers are such that his essential production must either be
seriously curtailed or maintained by sacrificing the essential production of other
may regulate a business in any of its aspects." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (x934). If
this principle applies to regulations under the police power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifth Amendment cannot impose a greater limitation on the war powers of Congress. Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries, 251 U. S. 146 (199).
"That one of the primary purposes of the Lever Act of the First World War, 40 STAT. 277 (1917),
was to prevent waste and hoarding was acknowledged in several Supreme Court cases without question
as to the legitimacy of the purpose. See, e.g., Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S.
253, 259 (x929); and see U. S. v. Penn. Central Coal Co., 256 Fed. 703, 705 (D. Pa. i918), in which
the court said "when a state of war exists, the whole nation is pledged to its successful prosecution.
Its resources must be controlled and preserved, that large armies may be maintained in the field."
Prevention of hoarding is mentioned as one of the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, Pub. L. No. 421, 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942).
"That the state has a legitimate interest in conserving its natural resources which it can protect by
regulatory and prohibitory laws is strikingly illustrated by statutes directed at conserving oil and natural
gas. Not only have purely wasteful measures of production been prevented, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U. S. 190 (xpoo), but the use of natural gas for certain nonessential purposes has been prohibited.
Wells v. Midland Carbon CO., 254 U. S. 300 (92o); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258 (x937);
see Ely, The Conservation of Oil (938) 5x Htatv. L. REv. 1209; Moses, Constitutional, Legislative and
ludicial Growth of Oil and Gas Conservation (1941) 13 Miss. L. J. 353. A similar public interest in
the conservation of its manpower was recognized in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S.
219 (1917). Cf. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (i885). In time of war a nation's manpower is
undoubtedly its most precious and most limited natural resource.
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employers from whom critical labor will be diverted. The public interest in such an
employer's enterprise far transcends the public interest asserted during peacetime
in public utilities or in other forms of private enterprise subjected to equally drastic
measures of controL4 6 The interest of Government in the continued and maximum
production of essential war industries is beyond dispute; it is a legitimate interest and
one which the Government may and does ofttimes subserve by itself undertaking the
performance of the same functions. The need for Government interference to insure
continued production will presumedly be demonstrable factually in terms of the
existence of a labor shortage, of the effect of that shortage upon the maintenance of
the employer's production levels and of the importance of continued production to
the continued existence of the sovereign itself. The controls involved will be regula-
tions of the employer's use of his labor force. The utilization of one's labor force
is not more sacrosanct than the price one may demand for his product, the wages he
pays his workers, or any of the innumerable incidents to the use of property and
labor which have been held subject to the police power of the states, or analogous
powers of the Federal Government. 47
The employer will, of course, not be required to continue his business; he may
abandon it at any time.48 But so long as he continues to produce materials or provide
"Consider, for example, the businesses "affected with a public interest," applying the quoted phrase
in the sense used in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (941), rather than Ribnic v. McBride, 277
U. S. 350 (1928). While the analogy to public utilities is helpful as indicating the legitimacy of
governmental concern in, and control of, war production enterprises, reservation must be made as to the
incidents of that control; thus assurance of a "fair return" would not seem necessary. See note 48 in/ra.
It is interesting to note that oil and gas conservation measures have been accomplished without de-
pendence upon the public utility concept. Cf. Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U. S.
235 (1929).
Any attack would probably be based on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. But
the test of due process is reasonableness of relation to the end sought to be achieved. The controls
would be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment "only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted inter-
ference with individual liberty." Ncbbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 539 (1934). The war powers
of Congress, like the interstate commerce power, are at least equivalent to the police power of the states.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146 (i99); U. S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative Co.,
307 U. S. 533 (1939). As to the extent of the war powers, see Miller v. U. S., ix Wall. 493 (1871);
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135 (1919).
So tremendous is the war power that the test for due process may be not the presence of reasonableness
but the absence of arbitrariness; the criterion expressed in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., sttpra,
at 163, was that "its action, unless purely arbitrary, must be accepted and given full effect by the
Courts." Cf. U. S. v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1 (1926); Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47
(i919); see U. S. v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 6o5, 622 (1931); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
209 U. S. 398, 426 (1934). A discussion of the war powers is contained in Hearings before the Houe
Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 5479, superseded by H. R. 5990, Price Control Bill,
7 7 th Cong., ist Sess. (1941), Pt. i, 63 et seq.
's On this basis the public utility cases may be distinguished to the extent that their regulation may
depend upon the power of eminent domain and be subject to the rule of fair return. Smyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466 (1898). The "privilege" of discontinuing one's business has often been relied on as an
answer to the contention that one is deprived of property without due process if not assured a fair return
under governmental regulations and control. Cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876); Du Pont d
Nemours & Co. v. Hughes, 5o F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931). Even as respects public utility cases the
rule of fair return does not justify unreasonable rates notwithstanding such rates being the only alternative.
Public Service Comm'n v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S. 530 (z933). The right to go out
of business may be circumscribed by governmental regulation in time of emergency. "The power to
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facilities, in the continued production of which the public has a legitimate interest,
he will be required to comply with whatever reasonable regulation the Government
finds necessary to protect its interest. Any losses which occur by reason of his com-
pliance with such regulation, being losses attributable to a regulation of use required
in the public interest rather than a direct appropriation, will not constitute a "taking"
of private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, requiring just
compensation. 49  Indeed, since the public interest and the employer's own interest
largely coincide, it would be difficult if not impossible to ascribe the costs of
protecting the interest to anyone other than the employer. 50
(c) Displacement of Critical Workers from Nonessential Work. Assuming a
progressive tightening of the labor market due to the rapid expansion of the war
production program and the simultaneous withdrawal for the armed forces of many
would-be workers, it is not unlikely that the measures discussed above will prove
insufficient to meet the labor needs of essential war industries. Circumstances may
be such as to warrant compulsory discharge of workers from nonessential enterprises,
unaccompanied by the compulsory transfer of the displaced worker to essential war
industry. Such compulsion would operate exclusively upon the employer, the sub-
sequent employment or unemployment of the worker being left to the worker
himself, except insofar as employer controls, such as control of hiring processes, will
restrict the worker's choice of positions and in all probability lead to his employment
where most urgently needed in the war effort.
go out of business when it exists, is an illusory answer to gas companies and water works, but one
need not stop at that. The regulation is put and justified as a temporary measure. . . . A limit in
time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1921).
"Whether the type of legislation here considered would violate the "just compensation" provision
in the Fifth Amendment, would depend upon whether there is a "taking" of private property. That
clause is described in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (U. S. 187), "as referring only to
a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.
It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and
loss to individuals." See Hearings, supra note 47, at 302 ct seq. Thus price fixing and allocation during
the last World War, when unaccompanied by an actual requisition of the product, the price and dis-
position of which were minutely regulated, were held not to constitute a "taking" within the Fifth
Amendment. Morrisdale Coal Co. v. U. S., 259 U. S. 188 (1922); American Smelting Co. v. U. S.,
259 U. S. 74 (1922); Omnia Commercial Co., Inc. v. U. S., 261 U. S. 502 (1923); Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Hughes, 50 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1931). The dictum tending to the contrary
in Matthew Addy Co. v. U. S., 264 U. S. 239, 245 (1924), has not crystallized into law. Regulation
of the use of labor, including compulsory training, may increase the cost of doing business; as such it
is more analogous to minimum price fixing than to maximum price fixing. Cf. Hegeman Farms Corp.
v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934). More exact analogies are found in wage and hour laws, and laws
governing labor relations, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance. All of these laws
increased the costs of doing business, but none provided for compensation or assured a fair return,
U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. o00 (941); Mountain Lumber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U. S. 495 (1937).
" Incidental hardship in particular cases does not suffice to render an otherwise reasonable regula-
tion unconstitutional. N. Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573 (1938); Bayside
Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 (1936). And the fact that the loss due to the regulation might be
such as to put marginal competitors out of business does not of itself indicate unreasonableness. Opp
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293
U. S. 163 (934).
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Such restriction or prohibition upon an employer's right to enjoy the benefits of
an existing employment relationship has a direct analogy in wartime restriction on
the use of property and facilities required for the war effort. The employer's right
to the continued employment of a worker is at best equivalent to the right of a party
to an executory contract to demand performance; the Thirteenth Amendment would
preclude the assertion of a greater right.5 ' As such, the employer's interests are no
less immune to governmental deprivation than is the right of a contractor to per-
formance of a contract, performance of which is prohibited or rendered impossible
by the Government. There would, of course, be no occasion for compensation under
the Fifth Amendment. 2
The validity of such enabling legislation is largely dependent upon the manner in
which the governmental control is to be exercised. Compulsory measures of this
character are peculiarly susceptible to abuse, in that application of the controls may
result in unfair discrimination between employers of critical workers. While the
indirectness of the fundamental method is not in itself objectionable, the dissimilarity
between the end (i.e., to meet the labor needs of war industries) and the method
(i.e., to require non-essential employers to discharge critical workers), renders it
difficult to arrive at a modus operandi that will adequately subserve the purpose while
fully protecting employers against arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination. The
legislator's problem is further complicated by the fact that under these as well as
other measures discussed, the worker himself must be protected-a fact that sharply
differentiates this type of action from its counterpart in the control of materials and
facilities.
A possible approach is the classification of business enterprises normally employ-
ing critical workers in the order of their contribution to the war effort, employers
employing critical workers in enterprises at the bottom of the list being subject to
first call for the release of all or a certain proportion of their critical workers as the
needs of the war production program require. The classification of business enter-
prises, the determination of the type and number of workers required for war
production purposes, the designation of the enterprises which must release workers,
and the determination of the number or proportion which each must release, in order
to make available the number of workers required for war production purposes,
' Clyatt v. U. S., 197 U. S. 207 (1905).
"Continued employment of certain critical workers under the circumstances here considered has
become detrimental to the public interest. That which may be regulated may be prohibited altogether,
if prohibition is reasonably necessary to effect the legitimate ends of Government. Powell v. Pennsylvania,
127 U. S. 678 (1888). No taking of property under the Fifth Amendment is involved since the
effect of the prohibition is to end the contract of employment, not to appropriate it. Cf. Omnia Com-
mercial Co. v. U. S., 261 U. S. 502 (1923); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, 251 U. S. 146 (i919);
and cases cited in note 49 supra. Perhaps the closest analogies in the field of priority and allocation
control are found in the General Limitation Orders of the OPM and WPB which prohibit the production
of certain nonessential articles requiring needed raw materials and facilities or prohibit the use of
scarce materials in the producti6n of such articles. See Weiner, Legal and Economic Problems ol
Civilian Supply (1942) 9 LAw & CoNrTEMr. PaoD., 122, 132 et seq. The indirection of this type of
order is of special interest in this connection. -Damage to the worker would be incidental and within
the rule of the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (U. S. 1870).
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would be left to the administrative agency. Refinements reasonably related to the
purposes, such as designation by locality rather than nationally, and special dispensa-
tion for hardships either to employers or workers, or both, would not present legal
obstacles.53 Objections based on the unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the classifica-
don would not be applicable under such an approach, and helpful analogies are
available in other forms of wartime Government controls. 54
Under any approach the selection, as between two or more employers in substan-
tially the same circumstances so far as their need for their critical workers and their
lack of relation to the war effort is concerned, could reasonably be made on the basis
of the likelihood of placing the displaced workers in war industry, including such
considerations as the willingness and availability of the worker himself. The stand-
ards to govern the selection of workers to be displaced under this type of measure
will entail greater difficulties than any measure heretofore considered, but if the
standards selected are consistent with the purpose to be subserved and are sufficiently
precise to insure against unreasonable and discriminatory treatment of employers and
workers, no valid legal objection could be made.5
2. Measures of Worker and Employer Control
The measures thus far discussed have involved exclusively controls or regulations
applicable solely to employers.50 Control or regulation of the other party to the em-
ployment relationship, the worker, is logically the next step. Up to this point, it has
been assumed that measures of employer control will be tried before the Government
embarks upon the next step. However, it is equally possible that measures of worker
control will be instituted simultaneously. In view of the difficulty of differentiating
between the interests of one worker and the interests of another and between the
types of worker interests involved in the usual employment relationship, 17 it is also
' "A dispensing power is a legitimate method of tempering the rigor of the law." FREuND, AnNInS-
TRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928) 133.
" The "Work or Fight" order of the Provost Marshal General in the First World War followed
this approach, specifying certain occupations (i.e., the "service" occupations) as nonproductive, and
rendering all men so engaged liable for immediate induction regardless of dependency status. SEcoND
REP. oF PROvos-r MARsA. GENERA. (1918). A similar approach occurs in the General Limitation
Orders (L orders) and Material Orders (M orders) of the present WPB, the production of certain
articles or the use of certain scarce materials in their production being restricted or prohibited. See
note 28, supra.
" Compare the standard for allocation of shortage materials and facilities in §2(a) of the Priorities
Act, as most recently amended by the Second War Powers Act. Pub. L. No. 507, 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess.
(March 27, 1942), i.e., "as he [the President] shall deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and to promote the national defense."
" The measures of employer-control discussed previously could be fortified by applying penalties
for their enforcement against workers as well as employers Since the worker's and the employer's
rights would in each instance be correlative, restraints upon the worker's rights would have the same
legal aspects as restraints upon the corresponding rights of the employer. For this reason, and because
imposition of penalties upon the worker as well as the employer would deprive the measure of most
of the administrative advantages of employer, as contrasted with worker, controls, they require little
discussion. Nevertheless, Canada has thus far consistently followed this approach. See note 3 supra,
and notes 57 and 6o infra.
" Any such differentiation must necessarily be- arbitrary. Canada, for example, has recently taken
steps to prevent persons presently engaged in agriculture from securing other than farm employment.
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probable that the measures discussed separately below, would be instituted simul-
taneously.
(a) Freezing in employment. Freezing in employment involves restriction of the
right of a worker to leave his employment. The purpose of such a measure is to
preserve for certain essential production its current labor supply and to prevent the
labor waste incident to uncontrolled labor turnover. Consistently with that purpose,
the measure would presumedly be applied only to critical workers, conservation of
whose labor is a legitimate concern of the Government. Whether the public interest
would reasonably extend to the prevention of labor waste incident to the turnover
of critical workers not engaged in essential war production, is a matter not free from
doubt. The distinction between the Government's interest in this form of waste and
its interest in waste of critical workers due to employer nonutilization is apparent;
its interest in the latter is in the placement and full utilization of the workers in war
production enterprises. If universal freezing is instituted, its strongest justification is
the administrative one; it may be impossible to devise a workable procedure or a
sufficiently precise standard by which employers and workers could ascertain or be
informed whether or not they are engaged in activities deemed essential to the war
effort; if that administrative difficulty is real and demonstrable, precedent exists for
reliance upon it.58
Since no essential legal difference exists between compelling a worker to remain
in a particular employment with a private employer, and compelling an individual to
accept a particular employment with a private employer, the constitutional issues
involved in both measures will be discussed later. Upon principles already discussed
in connection with measures of employer control, the public interest in the labor of
critical workers is sufficient to justify all otherwise constitutional measures reasonably
related to eliminating the waste of such labor caused by turnover. That labor turn-
over directly results in appreciable labor waste, and that freezing critical workers will
curtail labor turnover, requires no demonstration.
A freezing program entails governmental control not only of a worker's right to
leave his employment but also of an employer's right to discharge the worker. The
unrestricted exercise of either right results in labor turnover. The right of an em-
Persons whose freedom of employment is thus restricted are those who were employed at farm work
on a certain date, i.e., the effective date of the regulation. Obviously, mere happenstance distinguishes
farm laborers who are and who are not affected by the regulations, and, while the distinction is per-
fectly reasonable in the light of the broad purposes to be subserved, it is essentially arbitrary as respects
each individual concerned. The Stabilization of Employment in Agriculture Regulations (P. C. 2251),
Canada, Emergency Laws, Orders and Reg., Pt. 37, P. 31. Simultaneous imposition of a more drastic
form of worker-control such as compulsory transfers, discussed, infra, p. 457, would have permitted a
more reasonable classification, i.e., one based on their qualifications or experience as farm workers, and
would have relieved the regulations of the arbitrariness inherent in its dependence on what is essentially
an irrelevant factor-the engagement at farm work on a particular date.
" Cf. Bayside Fisch Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 (x936); Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264
(1920); Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. r92 (i92); Dreyfoos v. Edwards, 284 Fed. 596
(S. D. N. Y. i959), aff'd, 251 U. S. 146 (igg).
SoME LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATIaME LABOR MOBILIZATION
ployer to discharge a worker is no less subject to regulation and control in the public
interest than is his right to hire or to fix the terms of employment.59
It should be noted that the right of a worker to quit and the corresponding right
of an employer to discharge constitute primary factors in the shaping of their em-
ployment relationship. Simultaneous deprivation of the right to quit and the right
to discharge in effect leaves the relationship without a rudder. Some Government
control of the terms and conditions of employment, in a manner fair to both parties,
is not only justified but necessary under the due process clause. It may therefore be
expected that if freezing measures are adopted, such measures will be accompanied
by incidental measures providing for governmental supervision of hours, wages,
working conditions, disciplinary action and the like, or at least for supervision of
certain changes therein. 60
(b) Compulsory Transfer. Under a compulsory transfer program, individuals are
required to accept employment with a particular employer and the designated em-
ployer is required to employ the individual. Such a program necessarily entails
freezing, i.e., restrictions upon the rights of both employer and worker to terminate
the resulting employment.
Obviously and immediately presented is the question of the validity of such meas-
ures under the Thirteenth Amendment."' Admittedly, such measures involve a
novel form of compulsory service.6 2 Yet, assuming a national emergency which
" Compare restrictions upon employers with respect to the hiring, tenure of employment, and dis-
charge of workers, prescribed in the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S C.
§S58 (3), (4). Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1940.
" The order of the Canadian Privy Council promulgating "The Stabilization of Employment in
Agriculture Regulations, 1942," effective March 23, 1942, supra note 57, in effect constitutes a freezing
measure. These regulations seek to accomplish "freezing" indirectly by restraining workers in agri-
culture on the effective date of the order from obtaining employment elsewhere, and at the same time
restraining prospective nonagricultural employers from hiring such a worker. The regulations do not
restrict the employer's right to discharge an agricultural worker, nor the latter's right to quit a par-
ticular agricultural employer. A somewhat similar technique is followed in other orders of the
Canadian Privy Council which forbid the entry into employment in specified nonessential activities
(called "restricted occupations") of certain male persons, Order of March 21, 1942, and require em-
ployers to release critical workers requested by the Minister of Labour to transfer to essential work.
See note 3, supra.
" U. S. Co;sT., Amend. XI, provides in part: "Section r. Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
" There are many early English statutes the object of which "was partly the suppression of va-
grancy, but it was also generally considered a proper function of the police power to secure, if necessary,
by compulsory measures, to agriculture and industry an adequate and steady supply of labor." FREuND,
POLICE POWER, §448, Cf. §408. This author continues: "At the present day it is only necessary to refer
to this kind of labor legislation in order to point out its unconstitutionality. The requirement would
beyond any doubt be involuntary servitude forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, and a statutory minimum term for labor contracts is an indirect form of compulsory
service." England now has wartime statutes, regulations and orders which far eclipse the earlier
statutes in their controls of workers and employers, e.g., Emergency Powers (Defense) Act (1940) 3 & 4
GEO. VI, c. 20; 5 & 6 GEo. VI, c. 4 (1941); Defense Regulations 54 (194o) (controlled undertakings)
and 58 A (1940) (control of employment); The Essential Work (General Provisions) Order, 1941,
S. R. 6o, 1941, No. 302. See Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, supra note 3, at 69 el seq.
Clearly distinguishable are some of the so-called Counsel of Defense statutes enacted by several
states during the First World War requiring persons to be gainfully employed, the restraint being
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warrants such measures, in only one material respect have the forms of compulsory
service heretofore sanctioned under the Thirteenth Amendment differed from the
compulsory service now under consideration, to-wit, all found precedent in our own
or pertinent English history.6" The lack of historical precedent for the measures here
considered can be readily explained by the novelty of the circumstances which may
confront the nation; while such precedent would be useful, its absence per se should
not constitute a constitutional obstacle. 4
Underlying every type of compulsory servitude heretofore upheld is the funda-
mental element, often described as the justifying element, that the servitude was in
the public interest.6 5 Underlying every type of compulsory servitude held prohibited
against idleness rather than upon the individual's choice of employment. The statutes are collected in
Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, supra note 3, at 6o. One of these, NV. Va. Acts 3957, 2d Ex. Sess,, c. sa,
was held unconstitutional in Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S. E. 327 (gzo), principally on
the grounds that it was not the vagrancy law it purported to be because it was not conditioned on
financial distress, and that the state had no war powers. The latter argument seems unsound. Gilbert
v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920); State v. McClure, 7 Boyce 265, 105 At. 72 (Del. 1gig). Other
similar statutes, more in point, provided for assignment of the idle individual to some useful employ-
ment upon terms agreed upon by the assigning state officer and the prospective employer. E.g., Md.
Laws Ex. Sess. 1917, c. 33; Del. Laws 1918, c. 3. The Delaware statute was held constitutional in
State v. McClure, supra, the court recognizing its true purpose and upholding it under the state's war
power. The court added: "Nor do we consider it necessary or important to determine what in times
of peace may or may not constitute involuntary servitude as meant by the Thirteenth Article of the
Constitution." State v. McClure, supra at 733. The Maryland statute, still in effect, provides elaborate
safeguards for the rights of individuals. Under all such statutes, the individual is little restrained in
choice of employments and presumedly could with impunity leave the assigned employer for other
useful employment.
"Historical considerations were relied upon almost exclusively to sustain compulsory service under
seamen's contracts, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897), and on public roads, Butler v. Perry,
240 U. S. 328 (1916). Cf. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (x863).
"The fallacy of the historical argument was pointed out by Harlan, I., dissenting in Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 288 (1897). From one point of view, the fact that a particular form of
involuntary servitude was well known prior to the Thirteenth Amendment would evidence an intent
that the Amendment apply thereto--otherwise, there should have been a specific exception. The effect
of the decisions has, strangely enough, been to confine the Amendment to special types of involuntary
servitude well known at the time of its adoption, such as-peonage and long-term contracts for personal
service, to render it inapplicable to other equally well-known servitudes, and to leave open its applica-
tion to any completely novel type of servitude which could not have been in contemplation when the
Amendment was adopted. In this light, then, lack of historical background may as well be an asset
as a liability in the constitutional argument.
"Types of involuntary personal service recognized as constitutional may roughly be divided into
two categories-compulsory service directly to the state, and compulsory service directly to, or imme-
diately benefiting, private persons but required in the public interest. Included in the first category
are building and maintaining public roads, Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (x16); jury duty, c/. State
v. Cantwell, 142 N. C. 604, 55 S. E. 820 (i9o6); assistance in making an arrest, cf. Dougherty v.
State, 3o6 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393 (x895); attendance as witness, cf. State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, 4
S. V. 352 (1897); compulsory military service, The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918);
U. S. v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423 (E. D. Mich., 1917); civil service as a public officer, Crews v. Lundquist,
361 Ill. 193, 197 N. E. 768 (1935); London v. Headen, 76 N. C. 72 (3877); MEcmsm, THE LAW Or
PuaLsc OFFIcESs (3890) 155 et seq. In the other category might be included service as a seaman,
Robertson v. Baldwin, 365 U. S. 275 (3897); ci. Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 6z Sup. Ct. 886 (1942);
minors under apprenticeship, Kennedy v. Neara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S. E. 243 (19o6); see Case of Mary
Clark, Blackf. 122, 123 (Ind. 1821); service in certain private employments whose abandonment would
endanger public safety, Fa~uND, PoLICE PowaEt (r904) §452. Mr. Freund concludes an interesting
discussion on this subject as follows: "We may then conclude that in a business affected with a public
interest, the violation of a contract of service which is essential to the carrying on of the business, may,
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under the Thirteenth Amendment, is the fundamental element that the servitude
was in the interest of private persons. In those cases in which the servitude in ques-
tion was servitude to the State (as has been most frequently the case) little or no
necessity existed for inquiry as to the presence of an adequate public interest.66 The
duty to serve the State which the courts have emphasized in these cases appears to
be but another form of expression for the underlying principle that where private
rights and public interests conflict, the latter must prevail. 7 Though the outstanding
instance of compulsory service under a private contract of hire, that of a seaman, was
justified on historical grounds,'" the underlying public interest in the seaman's
servitude is apparent and has not escaped judicial notice. 9
If, by reason of withdrawals of manpower for the armed forces, the stringencies
in the labor market render essential some program to assure the availability of the
maximum possible number and type of workers required to maintain essential
civilian and war production activities, the existence and the legitimacy of a para-
mount public interest in whatever involuntary servitude is inherent in compulsory
transfer and freezing measures seems clear. Under such circumstances, assuming
proper worker safeguards, such compulsory servitude, though ostensibly servitude
to the employer, is more realistically servitude to the State. Its exclusive purpose is
to promote the public, not the employer's interests. The governmental restrictions
upon the employer's ordinary rights and privileges in the employment relationship,
which accompany the freezing and transfer measures, must clearly disprove the exist-
ence of any of the elements which characterize servitudes held unconstitutional by
the courts. If the Government enters this field of labor mobilization, the resulting
compulsory relationships between employer and worker will probably bear only
token resemblance to the usual employment relationship; such servitude as exists will
be imposed alike upon employer and worker, and both in a more real sense will be
servants of the Government.70 Objections to these measures under the due process
as a matter of constitutional power, be punished." FRauND, op. cit. supra, at 483; compare note 62
supra. Several state statutes limit the right to strike in industries affected with a public interest. E.g.,
Mich. Pub. Acts 1939, Act No. x76; MiNN. SrAT. (Mason Supp. 1940) §§4254-26 and 27; COLo. ANN.
STAT. (1935) c. 97. Defense work was ruled "affected with a public interest" within the meaning of
the Michigan statute, supra, in Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 18503. See comments (1940) 40 MNcm L.
REv. 1041, xo65.
"Compare the summary dismissal of the involuntary servitude objection in The Selective Draft
Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (siq8), with the laborious arguments in Robertson v. Baldwin, x65 U. S. 275
(1897). The dissenting opinion in the Robertson case recognized that "involuntary service rendered for
the public, pursuant as well to the requirements of a statute as to a previous voluntary arrangement,
is not, in any legal sense, either slavery or involuntary servitude." Id. at 298. While this statement
was made to distinguish soldiers and sailors from civilian seamen, it suggests that the dissent failed
to recognize the public interest in the servitude involved.
""Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
"Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897).
"
0 Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F. (2d) 336, 345 (C. C. A. 2d, 194).
"
0 The "essence of involuntary servitude" prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment is "that control
by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit." Hughes, J.,
in Bailey v. Alabama, 2r9 U. S. 219, 238 (19xi). It precludes serfage, vassalage, villenage, peonage
"and all other forms of compulsory services for the mere benefit or pleasure of others." Field, J.,"
dissenting in Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 90 (U. S. 1873). Slavery has been variously defined
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clause, insofar as they are based on the subjection of the worker to the employer, or
vice versa, must be considered in the light of the principles heretofore discussed with
respect to the Thirteenth Amendment; indeed, protection of the individual from the
State is more properly the function of the Fifth Amendment than of the Thirteenth.
The amenability of many employers' peacetime rights to suspension and restric-
tion by the Congress acting under its war powers has already been discussed. Com-
pulsory transfer and freezing measures, from the employer's standpoint involve sus-
pension or restriction of the employer's right to enter into, to terminate, and to fix
the terms of an employment relationship. Insofar as all these partake of property
rights, they are no less subject to governmental control than are those of the property
owner during time of war. And just as the goods or facilities of the property owner
cannot be taken or diverted to a public use without just compensation, 7" so an em-
ployer may not be required, under a freezing and transfer program, to enter into, or
to refrain from terminating, an employment relationship, the terms and conditions
of which are so unconscionable as to amount to a taking of his property. Hence,
either the interests of the employer must be equitably protected in the fixing of the
terms and conditions of employment, or, if not so protected, some way must be found
to compensate the employer for any possible loss.
To the extent that the right to employ, supervise or discharge a worker partakes
of a personal, rather than a property, right, suspension or restriction of the employer's
rights is no different in principle from suspension or restriction of the corresponding
rights of the worker. The right of the employer to discriminate, in the hiring process,
on the basis of age, sex, color, nationality, etc., is, of course, a personal not a property
right.
It has sometim~es been said that the right of the worker to proffer or withhold
his services is in the nature of a property right;72 from this it might be argued that
compulsory service constitutes a taking for a public use within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, and hence to require just compensation." Though the worker's
right to work or not to work for another under the usual employment contract may
partake of a property right, as noted above, the relationship that results from com-
pulsory service of the type involved under compulsory transfer and freezing measures
differs materially from that which is the subject of an ordinary contract of employ-
ment. Though the worker's right may be a property right so far as the employer is
concerned, his rights vis-a-vis the State are quite different. In compelling a worker to
but always to include the concept of service for the benefit of the master. Civil Rights Cases, og U. S.
3 (z883); Plessy v. Ferguson, x63 U. S. 537 (1896). "The great purpose in view was liberty under
the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential
powers." Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 333 (x916). The right of the state to demand services of
its citizens, in peace as well as in war, and the corresponding duty of the individual to serve was en-
trenched at common law. "The right stands on at least as high a necessity as the right of eminent
domain." London v. Headon, 76 N. C. 72, 75 (877); Txaoo', PtmuC OvFicEns (1892) §§65-x67.
"
1 Int. Paper Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 379 (t93i); U. S. v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (U. S. 1872).
"' Cf. Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. 161 (x9o8).
"
3 It was so argued in Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 333 (1916).
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perform services in the State's behalf, the State is not "taking" the worker's property
but is asserting its paramount right to restrict his freedom and to control and regulate
his conduct in the public interest. And it is well settled that an individual may be
compelled to serve the State without any compensation whatsoever.14 The services
rendered pursuant to proper compulsory transfer and freezing measures are rendered
to the State, the employer in this sense being a convenient agent through whom the
Government exercises its powers.
The more difficult questions of due process will arise, not with respect to the
power of the Government to compel an individual to accept certain employment in
the public interest, but with respect to the manner in which that power is exercised.
A primary problem is the mutual protection of both worker and employer. It would
obviously be unconscionable for the Government to compel a worker to work for an
employer and then to abandon the field, leaving the worker at the mercy of the
employer whose interests are essentially in conffict with those of the worker. Both
the Thirteenth and the Fifth Amendment require governmental control of the terms
and conditions of employment under such circumstances in the worker's behalf; the
latter amendment requires corresponding control for the protection of the employer.
It is therefore to be expected that any enabling legislation providing for a compulsory
transfer and freezing program will either authorize or will have been preceded by,
appropriate controls over wages, hours, and conditions of work; such controls may
take a variety of forms, too numerous and varied to discuss here. The fundamental
consideration must be the interest of the public, though that interest should in the
usual case coincide with the interests of the worker and the employer. The principal
danger is that in operation, a particular action resulting in the worker's or employer's
detriment may be construed as taken in the employer's or worker's, rather than in
the public, interest.
"' Personal services, as contrasted with property, may be "taken" by the state without just com-
pensation. Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916); Crews v. Lundquist, 361 III. 193, 197 N. E. 768
(1935).
